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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDIGENT STATE PRISON-
ERS MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF AT-
TORNEYS IN PREPARING AND FILING LEGAL PAPERS.
The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts.' Specifically, prisoners
must be provided with adequate law libraries or assistance from
persons trained in the law to aid them in the preparation and filing
of legal papers.2 In Hooks v. Wainwright3 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida addressed the issue of
access to the courts by prisoners in Florida's correctional institu-
tions. The Hooks court concluded that the mandate of meaningful
prisoner access to the courts can only be satisfied by requiring
prison authorities to provide indigent state prisoners with the as-
sistance of attorneys and adequate law libraries.
The judiciary will generally refrain from interfering with the ad-
ministration of prisons by invoking a principle commonly referred
to as the "hands-off' doctrine. This doctrine has been eroded by
many Supreme Court decisions in the last forty years.' Although
still a factor in judicial decision making, it cannot be used to avoid
intervention when constitutional rights are threatened.7 The con-
stitutional right of prisoners of access to the courts was not recog-
nized by the Supreme Court until Ex parte Hull' in 1941. In Hull
the Court struck down a prison regulation which had been used to
1. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
2. Id. at 828.
3. 536 F. Supp. 1330 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
4. Id. at 1352.
5. See Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952) ("[I]t is not the function of the
Courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only
to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined."). For a discussion of the
"hands-olf' doctrine, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Re-
fusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
6. For a summary of cases in the developing area of prisoners' right of access to the
courts, see Annot., 52 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1978).
7. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832 ("While we have recognized that judicial restraint is often
appropriate in prisoners' rights cases, we have also repeatedly held that this policy 'cannot
encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims.' "); Johnson v. Av-
ery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969); Eisenhardt v. Britton, 478 F.2d 855, 855 (5th Cir. 1973);
Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1336.
8. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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prevent a prisoner from filing for a writ of habeas corpus.' In
Johnson v. Avery'0 the Supreme Court went one step further and
struck a regulation which did not operate as an absolute ban on
filing a petition but which was found to be an effective denial of
access to the courts." The regulation prohibited prisoners from as-
sisting each other in legal matters.12 Since there never had been an
obligation for the courts to appoint counsel for prisoners wishing
to seek post-conviction relief," the Court reasoned that an indi-
gent, illiterate prisoner would be denied access if he could not re-
ceive assistance from fellow inmates in drafting petitions.1 4 The
court held that the state had a duty not to prohibit such assistance
unless and until it furnished some "reasonable alternative," thus
imposing a negative duty upon the state."
In Younger v. Gilmore's this negative duty became an affirma-
tive obligation to provide access to an adequate law library or to
equally effective alternatives of legal assistance.17 The Younger rul-
ing was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1977 in Bounds v.
Smith,"' and the Bounds opinion stands today as the principal Su-
preme Court expression of prisoners' constitutional right of access
9. Id. at 548-49. The prisoner prepared his petition and took it to a prison official to be
notarized. The prison official took the papers and not only refused to notarize them but also
refused to mail them. The prisoner then gave his father a copy of the petition to mail, but it
was confiscated by the prison guards. Finally, the prisoner attempted to mail a letter to the
Clerk of the Supreme Court but the letter was intercepted and sent to a legal investigator
for the state parole board. Id. at 547.
10. 393 U.S. at 483. Johnson concerned a motion for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 484. The
rationale was extended in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), to cover an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court noted:
The right of access to the courts . . . is founded in the Due Process Clause and
assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. It is futile
to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitu-
tional scheme than does the Great Writ.
Id. at 579.
11. 393 U.S. at 487.
12. Id. at 484.
13. Id. at 488. See also Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964) (prisoner has no
right to appointed counsel when seeking a writ of habeas corpus).
14. 393 U.S. at 488.
15. Id. at 490. Accord Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. 893, 896 (M.D. Fla. 1968),
afl'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969).
16. 404 U.S. 15 (1971), a per curiam decision affirming Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp.
105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), by citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. at 483, without discussion.
17. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110-11 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afl'd per curiam sub
nom, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
18. 430 U.S. at 817-18.
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to the courts."0
The Court in Bounds held that the right of access can be assured
by providing prisoners with an adequate law library or assistance
from persons trained in the law. Bounds left the states free to de-
vise alternatives and, in fact, the Court encouraged experimenta-
tion,'0 with the requirement that any program or combination of
programs must satisfy the constitutional requirement of meaning-
ful access for all prisoners."1 The Court limited its holding to the
preparation and filing of legal papers,22 and the opinion suggested
that it may be further limited to a claim which attempts a "vindi-
cation of fundamental civil rights,' or when a new trial or release
from confinement is sought."
The dimensions of the constitutional right of "meaningful ac-
cess" had not been defined by Bounds when Harold Raymond
Hooks initiated the present litigation in 1970. Hooks, an indigent
inmate confined to Avon Park Correctional Institution filed a civil
rights 5 class action 6 alleging that the insufficiency of legal services
in prisons maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections
constituted a denial of due process of law, equal protection of the
law and access to the courts.'7 Hooks initially sought to have the
19. For a discussion of Bounds and its implications, see Potuto, The Right of Prisoner
Access: Does Bounds Have Bounds? 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1978).
20. 430 U.S. at 830-32.
21. Id. at 823.
22. Id. at 828.
23. Id. at 827.
24. Id. The Hooks court apparently read the decision as being limited to state and fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings and federal civil rights proceedings. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at
1352.
25. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284
(Dec. 29, 1979)), provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
26. The class was certified on December 6, 1972, and consisted of "all indigent inmates
who are presently or will hereafter be in the custody of defendant Louie L. Wainwright,
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections." Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1331 & n.3 (footnote
omitted).
27. Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163, 165 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Hooks originally filed
a state habeas corpus petition to challenge his state court conviction. The petition was sum-
marily denied by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1332.
Thereafter, he filed two complaints in the federal district court. The first sought to compel
the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court to send Hooks free of charge a copy of an opinion
he needed to prepare his appeal. The Clerk had demanded the usual five dollar fee for this
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prison law library facilities upgraded or to have counsel provided
by the state to assist inmates with their legal documents.
Judge Charles R. Scott wrote for the federal district court in
1972, more than nine years before his opinion in the present case,
and found "invidious discrimination on account of poverty" had
been established since indigent inmates were not provided with
either assistance of counsel or library materials adequate to enable
them to pursue post-conviction relief.28 The parties and four amici
curiae2 9 were ordered to develop proposals which would satisfy the
state's obligations under Younger v. Gilmore."0 All four amici cu-
riae concluded that libraries alone, without professional legal assis-
tance, could not ensure meaningful access to the courts by indigent
inmates. The defendant's proposal (hereinafter the Wainwright
proposal) entailed an enlarged statewide library system.31 The
court took the matter under advisement, and four-and-a-half years
later found that the Wainwright proposal, as implemented, 2 was
unsatisfactory in light of the then recently announced Supreme
Court opinion of Bounds v. Smith."3
service. The second complaint sought to compel defendant Louie Wainwright to provide
Hooks with access to a law library and a typewriter. Both complaints were dismissed with-
out prejudice by the district court on July 23, 1971, even though Younger v. Gilmore was
pending before the Supreme Court. Id. at 1332-33 & n.6. Hooks appealed the dismissal or-
der which was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
cause was remanded for further proceedings in light of Younger. Hooks v. Wainwright, 457
F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. Hooks, 352 F. Supp. at 168.
29. The United States of America, The Florida Bar, the Florida Volunteer Parole Aide
Program, and Professor L. Harold Levinson. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
30. 404 U.S. at 15. The district court said that the plan should include, among others,
the following considerations: where, and in which institutions professional or quasi-profes-
sional services would be provided; the nature and extent of those services; and the method
of access to such services by those indigent inmates confined in institutions where legal
services were not available. Hooks, 352 F. Supp. at 169. Thus, the district court first inti-
mated that law libraries alonemight be insufficient. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1334.
31. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1334.
32. The program included some library facilities and, in addition, the Prison Project
which was developed in 1973. Id. at 1344 n.9. See infra note 95 for a discussion of the Prison
Project.
33. Id. at 1336 (citing Hooks v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1978)).
In 1975, three inmates in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections filed a
motion for leave to intervene, complaining that despite the district court's order of Decem-
ber 6, 1972, indigent prisoners in Florida were not being provided with meaningful access to
the courts. Id. at 1334 & n.8. The motion to intervene was granted and plaintiff-intervenors
obtained a preliminary injunction forbidding the state from discontinuing the Prison Pro-
ject, and requiring the state to assume all of its financial support when federal funding
expired on October 1, 1977. Id. at 1335. The program was to be maintained by the state
until the court approved a plan ensuring access to the courts by all of Florida's inmates. The
order was affirmed in Hooks v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d at 1102.
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An additional four-and-a-half years passed and the parties still
were unable to agree on a suitable statewide plan." During that
time the complaint was amended to include the claim that the as-
sistance of state-provided counsel, in addition to adequate law li-
braries, was required in Florida by Bounds. The parties asked the
court to determine whether Wainwright's final proposal was ade-
quate. The district court studied the final Wainwright proposal,
which provided for law libraries and inmate law clerks, and found
the proposal insufficient for several reasons: not all of Florida's
prisoners would have direct physical access to an adequate library;
the high rate of illiteracy among prisoners ensures that most would
be unable to conduct meaningful legal research alone; and inmate
law clerks were not sufficiently qualified to assist prisoners in con-
ducting meaningful research."5
In analyzing the physical access requirement, the court noted
that 21,575 inmates were housed in eighty widely dispersed facili-
ties"' ranging in size from major institutions to road prisons and
vocational training centers. 7 Wainwright's proposal called for
seven major librariess8 and twenty less complete libraries3' at the
34. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1336-37.
35. Id. at 1341, 1346.
36. See also Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968
(1972), in which the court of appeals held that a Texas plan for providing prisoner access to
the courts should take into account the great geographical dispersion of correctional
facilities.
In Novak the prison regulations prohibited inmates from assisting each other in legal
matters. The prison officials argued, however, that they were providing the prisoners with a
reasonable alternative in the form of a small library, a room set aside for writ writing and
two full-time attorneys. In addition, there was a law student summer program through
which three students were hired during the summer of 1970. Id. at 663. The court found
that although it was not certain that this plan was not a reasonable alternative, the state
failed to meet its burden of proving the plan was a reasonable alternative, due to the high
illiteracy rate, language problems and geographical dispersion. Id. at 663-64.
37. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. 1337 (citing Annual Report of the Florida Department of Cor-
rections, FY 1980-81 at 58).
38. The court noted that the seven major libraries would contain the following materials:
1. Florida Statutes Annotated (West), 65 volumes
2. Florida Digest (West), 37 volumes
3. United States Code Annotated (§§ 1981-1985, West), 42 volumes
4. Southern Reporter 2d Series, Florida Cases (West)
5. Criminal Law Reporter (Bureau of National Affairs)
6. Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th ed.)
7. Supreme Court Reporter (1950 to date, West), 45 volumes
8. Federal Reporter 2d Series (1950 to date, West)
9. Federal Supplement (1950 to date, West)
10. Shepard's United States Citations
11. Shepard's Federal Citations
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state's largest institutions.40 The court stated that the materials
available at the major libraries were "relatively complete," but the
twenty smaller libraries would lack "West's Federal Reporter 2d
Series or Federal Supplement . . .any type of case reporter con-
taining opinions of the United States Supreme Court. . .and any
volumes of [United States Code Annotated] relating to federal
habeas corpus remedies or federal crimes and criminal proce-
dure," '41 volumes which other courts have required.4
One major deficiency of the Wainwright proposal was that the
remaining prisoners in minor institutions would have no physical
access to a law library. Considering further that the smaller librar-
ies were deficient, fully one-half of Florida's inmates would be
without direct access to an adequate library.48 The defendant ar-
gued that each of the many minor facilities need not be equipped
12. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (West)
13. LaFave & Scott, Hornbook on Criminal Law
14. Shepard's Florida Citations
15. Florida Jurisprudence (1st and 2d Series)
16. Adkins & Harrison, Florida Criminal Law and Procedure Annotated
17. Modern Federal Practice Digest (West)
18. West's Federal Practice Digest (West)
Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1338 n.15. The court noted that two works not on the above list
would be of particular importance to inmates: Sokol's Federal Habeas Corpus (2d ed. 1969)
and Antieau's Federal Civil Rights Acts: Civil Practice (1971). Id.
39. The court noted that the twenty smaller libraries were supposed to contain the fol-
lowing materials:
1. Florida Statutes Annotated (West), 65 volumes
2. Florida Digest (West), 37 volumes
3. Florida Practice Series
4. United States Code Annotated (§§ 1981-85)
5. Southern Reporter 2d Series (Florida Cases) (West)
6. Criminal Law Reporter (Bureau of National Affairs)
7. Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed.)
Hooks, 536 F. Supp. 1339 n.17. For studies of what has been found to be the minimum
standards for prison law library collections, see Prison Law Library Service: Questions and
Models, 72 LAW LESR. J. 598 (1979) (hereinafter Prison Law Library); Reeves, The Evolving
Law of Prison Law Libraries, 3 NEW ENG. J. PISON LAW 131 (1976).
40. The major libraries were located at Apalachee Correctional Institution, Avon Park
Correctional Institution, Broward Correctional Institution, Florida State Prison, Glades
Correctional Institution, Sumter Correctional Institution and Union Correctional Institu-
tion. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1338.
41. Id. at 1338-39.
42. See Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 720 (5th Cir. 1980) (dicta) (Federal Supplement);
Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Federal Reporters), a/f'd, 591 F.2d
1338 (3d Cir. 1979); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 902 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (requiring
United States Supreme Court Reports; Lawyers' Edition, Second Series; and United States
Code Annotated, Titles 18, 28, and 42, §§ 1891-1988, among others).
43. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1339.
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with a library because prisoners could order photocopies of materi-
als from one of the major libraries. 44 The court noted that an in-
mate forced to rely on photocopied materials would be required to
know the citation of the precise case or statute upon which he in-
tended to rely.4 5 A related difficulty was that an inmate on death
row or in administrative confinement in a facility with a law li-
brary normally would be limited to three volumes or cases per
week." The court strongly objected to such a shot in the dark ap-
proach to legal research. It followed the reasoning of many other
courts and found that it would be "absurd to expect that anyone,
particularly an untrained and typically uneducated prisoner, could
conduct meaningful legal research" under such an arrangement. 47
44. Id. at 1342-43. The witnesses for the Wainwright proposal testified that prisoners at
institutions without a law library could request a transfer to another institution. The court
responded that it would be an unsatisfactory policy to require an inmate at a facility which
provides a great deal of freedom to transfer to a high security facility in order to enjoy his or
her right of access to the courts. Id. at 1343.
45. Id. at 1343.
46. Id. at 1342.
47. Id. at 1343. Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1024 (5th Cir. 1979) (It is "impossible
for them to know what cases to look up to buttress their claims and where those cases could
be found."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981), cert, dismissed,
453 U.S. 950 (1982).
The court in Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
911 (1979), stated that "[slimply providing a prisoner with books in his cell . . . gives the
prisoner no meaningful chance to explore the legal remedies he might have. Legal research
often requires browsing through various materials in search of inspiration." Williams in-
volved three differing factual situations. First, in the Virginia state prison, the prisoners had
access three times a month to a library which lacked some required materials and had ap-
pointed counsel to assist them in .'any legal matter relating to their incarceration'." Id. at
1338. The court found this program met the Bounds mandate of meaningful legal access. Id.
at 1339. Second, in South Carolina, prisoners in the maximum security section were not
allowed direct physical access to the library but were allowed time in a library cell from
which they could request specific materials. In addition, legal assistance was provided by the
public defender's office and a law student program for the preparation of habeas corpus
petitions. Id. at 1338. The court found this program provided meaningful access. Id. at 1339.
Finally, in a Richmond City Jail, prisoners were given access to an adequate library but only
for forty-five minutes, three times a week. No research assistance program was available. Id.
at 1338-39. The court found this program to be facially unconstitutional since such severe
time restrictions on direct access could only be upheld if trained research assistants were
also available. Id. at 1340.
United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("effective
legal research is impossible where it must be attempted at a remote distance from the
volumes, with hopeful stabs at three books at a time spaced over intervals of two days or
so"), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). But see Fluhr v. Roberts, 460 F. Supp. 536
(W.D. Ky. 1978) (in which an interlibrary loan program was approved); Prison Law Library
Service, supra note 39, at 602-03 (interlibrary loan programs have the potential for meeting
the constitutional obligations of the states).
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The court did not address two factors which might distinguish
minor institutions from facilities required to have extensive law li-
braries. As the defendant pointed out, many prisoners housed in
road prisons or community correctional institutions have some
freedom to come and go. It might have been argued that being
held in an unequipped prison is not a denial of access if a prisoner
had an adequate opportunity to visit an outside library. 8 On the
other hand, a prisoner who must spend each night in a camp dis-
tant from any urban area has in reality no greater opportunity for
meaningful research than if he had absolutely no freedom to come
and go. A second distinguishing factor would be the duration of the
confinement. One confined for only a week without access to an
extensive law library probably would not be heard to complain
that his right of access to the courts has been denied by the state.'9
The second reason announced by the district court for rejecting
Wainwright's proposal, and the basis for the court's finding that
law libraries alone were insufficient to provide meaningful access to
the courts was that the high rate of illiteracy among Florida's pris-
oners rendered them incapable of conducting meaningful legal re-
search.60 As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in
Cruz v. Hauck," it is not enough merely to supply books when
inmates lack the educational or linguistic skills to use them.2 The
Hooks court cited ample evidence that many of Florida's prisoners
cannot understand a law book because they are either underedu-
cated or do not read English.s At the 1973 evidentiary hearing, it
48. There is also a potential standing issue. See Prison Law Library, supra note 39, at
601. ("A prisoner must be able to allege and prove that he suffered an actual injury because
the prison authorities failed to provide either a law library or assistance from persons
trained in the law.").
49. See Fluhr, 460 F. Supp. at 537-38.
50. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1341. Much has been written on the problems of the indigent,
illiterate prisoner. See, e.g. Providing Legal Services to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REV. 363, 375
(1974); Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the
Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. Rv. 493, 508 (1970); Larsen, A Prisoner Looks
at Writ-Writing, 56 CAL. L. Rzv. 343 (1968).
51. 627 F.2d 710.
52. Id. at 720-21.
53. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1337-38, 1344 n.24. Even if the underlying facts constitute
the basis of a valid claim, the petition may be presented to the court in an unintelligible
form because of the prisoner's inability to comprehend the law. In a study of 170 applica-
tions for writs filed by Florida prisoners without the assistance of counsel, all contained at
least one misconception of the law. Note, Trial Court and Prison Perspectives on the Col-
lateral Post Conviction Relief Process in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. Rev. 503, 504 n.6 (1969)
(citing Kerper, On "Writs" and "Resocialization," 1967 AM. J. CoREcTioN 30). Accord Lar-
sen, supra note 50, at 352.
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was established that over one-half of Florida's prisoners read below
the seventh grade level,54 while legal materials were of college or
college graduate level in reading difficulty. 55 For those prisoners,
reading a law book would be like "attempting to read a book writ-
ten in a foreign language."" Today over one half of Florida's in-
mate population is functionally illiterate5 7 and the vast majority
are unable to afford counsel."
The result, in the district court's experience, was that pro se pe-
titioners were likely to produce complaints that were frivolous or
unintelligible.5 This seems to be the consensus of both the judici-
ary6" and commentators, 61 although the Supreme Court in Bounds
found pro se petitioners capable of using law books to raise serious
and legitimate complaints."
Even if the claim is intelligible and not frivolous, it may be in a
form insufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny. 3 The court in
54. Id. at 1337.
55. Id. at 1343.
56. Id. at 1344 (footnote omitted). Another analogy was provided by The Florida Bar:
"'[Glranting prisoners the use of a law library without the interpretive expertise of a lawyer
may be analogized to giving prisoners surgical equipment without a physician.' "Id. at 1334.
57. Id. at 1337.
58. Id. at 1338 (95%).
59. Id. at 1344.
60. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v.
Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 166-68 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. at 895.
But see Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 485 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 479 F.2d
1044 (5th Cir. 1973).
61. See supra note 50.
62. 430 U.S. at 826 ("We reject the State's claim that inmates are 'ill-equipped to use'
'the tools of the trade of the legal profession,' making libraries useless in assuring meaning-
ful access.") Contra 430 U.S. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("More than 20 years of experi-
ence with pro se habeas corpus petitions as a Member of this Court and as a Circuit Judge
have convinced me that 'meaningful access' to the federal courts can seldom be realistically
advanced by the device of making law libraries available to prison inmates untutored in
their use."); Johnson, 393 U.S. at 498 (White, J., dissenting).
63. The court quoted the following excerpt from an inmate's letter to illustrate that
there are numerous prisoners with potentially legitimate claims which may go unanswered
without the assistance of counsel:
I need help. Hope you understand cause these people don't.
Lt. [name omitted] had me place in open holding cell where I was once again
viciously assaulted. My lip was tore and I was beaten and bruised over my whole
body. I was tooken to M.T. I was treated by placeing 36 striche's in my [unintel-
ligible] lip area.
I am a register Epileptic and know Hemophilic. I have ask for Phychiatric
Treatment. Please let explain. 1. I been rape. 2. I watch my best friend get
stabb 27 time. He die right front my face. 3. I use to be on hard drugs till I come
to prison. 4. My parent abuse me. Like takeing your hands put them on stove.
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Hooks viewed this result as likely," both for the illiterate inmate
and the "highly intelligent and insightful" litigant, such as
Hooks." The Supreme Court has held that a complaint should
only be dismissed if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would enti-
tle him to relief.""' The pro se complaint should be held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers, 7 and should
be liberally construed by the courts.68 Even though a habeas
corpus petition or a civil rights complaint need only be a simple
recitation of facts giving rise to a cause of action,69 competent re-
search is a necessity. Issues such as jurisdiction, venue, standing,
exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and
types of relief available must be researched. 70 A petitioner "must
know what the law is in order to determine whether a colorable
claim exists, and if so, what facts are necessary to state a cause of
action. 7 1 Thus the average prisoner, because of his lack of educa-
tion and legal skills might not be able to even set forth a simple
statement of facts which would show him to be entitled to relief 72
The court in Hooks assumed that prisoners also lacked the abil-
ity to grasp the procedural intricacies necessary to establish a
claim. 8 Florida prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief are
Take a belt beat you till the blood run out.
I afraid to go to sleep. I stay awake. I can see me being rape or me takin that
neelle putting it in my arm or my father putting my hand on the stove it's driving
me crazy.
Please I need help. I use to be at the state hospital I sure [unintelligible] stay.
Please Judge Scott can you set an pointment with you like me talk to you. The
Dr. toll me she couldn't sent me state hospital for help.
Please I need help. I don't have but a mouth to go. I need to be somewhere I
can get help. I will stay as long as you see fit. For me to stay.
Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
64. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1344-45. Accord Note, Trial Court and Prison Perspectives
on the Collateral Post Conviction Relief Process in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 503, 509-10
(1969).
65. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1333.
66. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted).
67. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
68. Schaefer v. Stack, 641 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1981) (dicta).
69. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
70. Id. Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 110.
71. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825. See Jacob & Sharma, supra note 50, at 518-20.
72. See Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CAL. L. REv. 371, 374 (1968).
73. 536 F. Supp. at 1345-46. Hooks wrote the following letter to the late Honorable Wil-
liam A. McRae, Jr., in regard to pursuing an appeal of the denial of his state habeas corpus
action:
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required by statute 7  to first exhaust all state remedies. 5 Most fed-
eral habeas corpus petitions brought by prisoners are dismissed be-
cause they have failed to exhaust these remedies.7" Likewise, in an
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint may be dismissed be-
cause the inmate is unable to understand and respond to court or-
ders directing him to amend a defective pleading, or to respond to
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment."
Finally, the Hooks court analyzed the alternative of using inmate
law clerks. 8 One concern was that the clerks would be unwilling to
anger those officials who were responsible for their elevated status.
Thus, they would be reluctant to assist in civil rights actions
against prison authorities.7  The court, however, cited no instance
in which this occurred. 80 Another concern was that since inmate
law clerks themselves would be prisoners, they could not interview
witnesses, investigate cases, appear in court, or make long distance
telephone calls.8' The court also noted that the number of inmate
law clerks would be small and they would not be available at all
facilities. Their ability to respond to all the written requests for
assistance was doubted.82 Another potential problem, although not
noted by the court, is that a small contingent of jailhouse lawyers
What am I supposed to do now. The order [denying his habeas corpus petition]
does not give me the slightest indication why the petition was denied. There is no
record for appeal, so therefore only grounds for appeal would be mere conjecture
on my part. I don't even know if I can appeal the order. If I can appeal it, how do
I do it? How much time do I have? To what Court? Who is the Defendant in an
appeal? Is it Louie Wainwright through direct appeal? Or is it the Court of Ap-
peal through Mandamus? Or have I now exhausted my state remedies? I have
absolutely no idea what to do.
Id. at 1332.
74. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (1976) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the exis-
tence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner.
75. Leonard v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1345.
77. Id. Turk, Forward: Access to the Federal Courts by State Prisoners in Civil Rights
Actions, 64 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1353-54 (1978).
78. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1346-50.
79. Id. at 1348. Accord Wexler, The Jailhouse Lawyer as a Paraprofessional: Problems
and Prospects, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 139, 144 (1971).
80. The court did go to great lengths, however, to make an analogy between the pressure
experienced by in-house attorneys and prisoner writwriters. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1348-49.
81. Id. at 1348.
82. Id. at 1347.
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could not be expected to become competent in every area of the
law from which the prison population would produce grievances.
One commentator has noted that sentence computations and de-
tainers are areas which the professional writwriter does not
handle. 83
The real basis, however, for the court's objection to the use of
inmate law clerks was that they could not obtain the skills and
abilities possessed by attorneys. The court called reliance on such
"jailhouse lawyers"84 a "facade . . . that forces all prisoners in
need of legal assistance to rely upon a group of ill-trained laymen
who attempt to pass themselves off as lawyers." 85 Their limited
training could not enable them to either understand or formulate
meaningful legal reasoning."' By the court's own experience, even
the reasoning of veteran writwriters was "convoluted" and "non-
sensical. ' 87 Unflattering views of jailhouse lawyers are disputed by
some,88 but enjoy widespread acceptance.89
The court reinforced its basic assumption that inmate law clerks
were unqualified to function as lawyers by noting that many writ-
writers sought the assistance of attorneys in preparing their per-
sonal cases. The court cited this occurrence as evidence that the
writwriters were well aware of their own very severe limitations.90
Although the Wainwright proposal involved a thirty-hour legal re-
search course given by West Publishing Company to the inmate
law clerks, future clerks would be trained only by their predeces-
sors. Indeed, it must be questioned how much legal expertise can
be obtained in thirty-hours where the goal of the course is merely
to "teach the bare-bones mechanics of legal research." 91 Further-
more, the court noted that unlike an attorney, an inmate law clerk
could not operate independently of the influence of prison
83. Wexler, supra note 79, at 145. Another commentator found, however, that even a
lawyer who had not specialized in criminal law might be unable to fully develop a constitu-
tional claim. Note, Providing Legal Services to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REV. 363, 387 (1974).
84. For discussions concerning the jailhouse lawyer, see Wexler, supra note 79; Larsen,
supra note 50.
85. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1346.
86. Id. at 1347.
87. Id. at 1348.
88. See Prison Law Library, supra note 39, at 610; Wexler, supra note 79, at 143.
89. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 488 (Fortas, J., for the majority), 499-500 (White, J., dissent-
ing); Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131, 1146-47 (W.D. Wis. 1978); Larsen, supra note
50, at 348-49; Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 514, 520-22.
90. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1348.
91. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1340 (footnote omitted).
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authorities.2
The court concluded that lawyers apparently enjoy analytical
skills not shared by writwriters, law students or paralegals. In the
court's opinion lawyers are:
able to directly contact an inmate, listen to his claim, draw out
the essential facts, disregard the extraneous facts, analyze the
problem in light of existing law, and then decide whether the
claim should be pursued, either because it is meritorious under
existing law or because recent legal trends make it reasonably
likely that favorable new law could be established or unfavorable
precedent overturned. In short, lawyers not only understand the
law, but also possess the training and experience to use it
effectively."
In summary, the Hooks court held that the Wainwright proposal
was flawed because all prisoners were not afforded a means to ob-
tain meaningful access to the courts. The court emphasized that
many prisoners would not be granted direct physical access to an
adequate law library. The proposal ultimately failed, however, be-
cause the court believed the typical prisoner was intellectually in-
capable of conducting meaningful legal assistance alone and be-
cause inmate law clerks could not provide meaningful legal
assistance since they could not function as attorneys. The most sig-
nificant aspect of the Hooks decision was that the court ordered
the parties to submit new proposals which "must incorporate the
assistance of attorneys. ' ' 94 The court stated that consideration
should be given to the following:
1. Any acceptable plan must ensure meaningful access to the
courts on behalf of all persons ... committed to the custody of
the Florida Department of Corrections.
2. Attorney-assistance can be constitutionally limited, under
Bounds, to the preparation and filing of actions challenging the
legality of a prisoner's confinement (Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 proceed-
ings and state and federal habeas corpus proceedings) and the le-
gality of the conditions of a prisoner's confinement (federal civil
rights proceedings).
3. The attorney-assistance program should be structured so that
the attorneys, although funded by the state of Florida, would be
92. Id. at 1348-49.
93. Id. at 1350-51 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 1352.
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able to function independently....
4. Defendant should give serious consideration to a plan similar
to that proposed by plaintiff-intervenors .... "
5. The plan should provide for the continuation of defendant's
law library and inmate law clerk program in order to enable pris-
oners to represent themselves should they desire to do so."
The decree in Hooks which requires the assistance of attorneys
rests solely on the Bounds mandate that the state has an affirma-
tive duty to provide "meaningful access" to the courts for all pris-
oners.9 7 The district court did not analyze the constitutional source
for the right of access,9 but the Supreme Court has held that it is
founded on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The court was clearly sympathetic to the plight of prisoners,100 but
was pleased to assume the posture of having its hands tied by
Bounds.101 Perhaps this is because the Middle District has "fre-
quently been maligned for being 'soft' on prisoners. 'n0 The Hooks
court thus left the Supreme Court responsible for the significant
effects of the decision.1 03
95. The plan proposed by plaintiff-intervenors consisted of twenty attorneys assisted by
seven paralegals and seven secretaries. Since Florida's prison population has grown in the
four years since the plan was offered, a larger staff might now be required. Hooks, 536 F.
Supp. at 1352 n.37. The attorneys would be assigned to various offices located throughout
the state. The court apparently favored this plan because it would operate as an expanded
version of Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. (Prison Project). Id. at 1352. The Prison
Project provided indigent inmates in three of Florida's larger penal institutions with a wide
range of free legal services, including assistance in collateral attacks on convictions and civil
rights actions. Id. at 1334 n.9. See Belz, Legal Services for Florida's Inmates: Expanding
Access to the Courts by Hooks and Bounds, 56 FLA. B.J. 183, 184-85 (1982).
96. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1352.
97. Id. at 1349-52.
98. In his 1972 decision in Hooks v. Wainwright, Judge Scott found a denial of equal
protection and due process of law and a violation of the constitutional imperative of access
to the courts. 352 F. Supp. at 166.
99. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579. See Potuto, supra note 19, at 207-27, for an
analysis ofothe constitutional basis of Bounds.
100. 536 F. Supp. at 1341, 1353.
101. "Fortunately, the burden of deciding whether or not the right of meaningful access
exists does not lie with this Court. The Supreme Court has said that it does exist and this
Court is bound to follow that decision to the best of its ability." Id. at 1346.
102. Id. at 1353.
103. Consequently, the question of whether inmates should be afforded meaningful
access to the courts is no longer open to discussion. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or
unwisely, the highest court of our land has answered that question affirmatively.
Therefore, the only question left to decide is what type of plan would be sufficient
under the factual record developed in this case to ensure meaningful access to the
courts on behalf of Florida's inmates.
Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1340.
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The court apparently foresaw an adverse reaction among some
unincarcerated elements of society who would object to the addi-
tional expense of providing attorneys for prisoners. But in the
court's view, providing assistance of counsel would "result in re-
duced costs" for both the federal judiciary and the state of Flor-
ida. 10 4 First, the quality of petitions filed would be substantially
improved by the attorneys' assistance in drafting. This would
lessen the "amount of time typically required to peruse and con-
strue pro se petitions."' 05 Secondly, the court anticipated that the
assistance of counsel would lessen the workload of the federal
courts and the state attorney general's office by reducing the "tre-
mendous number of prisoner petitions presently being filed. ' "
Many institutional civil rights actions would be resolved through
discussions between the attorney and prison officials.10 7 In addi-
tion, many frivolous claims would never be filed since "presuma-
bly" an inmate would follow his counsel's advice.'0 8
The court's position that minimally trained inmates could not
function as attorneys is well supported. The Hooks opinion may be
reversed, however, because the Supreme Court has not mandated
the use of attorneys or their equivalent. The mandate in Bounds
was merely that prisoners be provided "a reasonably adequate op-
portunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitu-
tional rights to the courts."10 Access to the courts is recognized as
a constitutionally guaranteed right, but one which requires only
"meaningful access."' 10 If attorneys do not exclusively possess the
ability to provide meaningful access, then the Hooks court has mis-
applied Bounds. Bounds left the states free to devise any means of
access to the courts so long as that access is meaningful and rea-
104. Id. at 1351-52.
105. Id. at 1352. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 1351. See also Jacob & Sharma, supra note 50, at 520-21.
107. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1351. See also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831.
108. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1351. Another potentially significant effect of providing at-
torney assistance to prisoners has been suggested. It would serve to combat the social harm
created when a prisoner attempts to litigate his case alone. In such a situation he is likely to
lose respect for the legal system, and the process of rehabilitation will be thwarted. Jacob &
Sharma, supra note 50, at 511-12; Providing Legal Services to Prisoners, supra note 50, at
377-79. See also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 829-30.
109. 430 U.S. at 825. See also Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d at 720 ("The central question in
evaluating whether a law library adequately provides meaningful access to the courts is
whether the facility will enable the prisoners to fairly present their complaints to a district
court."); Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Prisoners do, however,
have a right of access to a threshold level of legal information or aid.").
110. 430 U.S. at 823.
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sonably adequate. If one who is not a licensed attorney is able to
understand and use the law effectively, it is no answer that an at-
torney possesses greater training and experience.
Indeed, the Hooks court may have gone beyond what the Elev-
enth Circuit may be inclined to define as meaningful access if prior
Fifth Circuit case law remains precedent."' In Stevenson v.
Reed" 2 the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
addressed the issue of whether "as a constitutional minimum,
prison inmates are entitled to access both to an adequate law li-
brary and state-supplied legal counsel""' for purposes of habeas
corpus or civil rights actions. The court held that attorneys were
not required when prisoners had access to an adequate law li-
brary.'" This decision was affirmed, per curiam, by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals."'
The facts in Stevenson are similar to those in Hooks. In Steven-
son the court acknowledged that the inmates had never been pro-
vided with legal counsel of any description. 1 6 The court estab-
lished that "most prisoners would not be able to well comprehend
and make intelligent use of the law library materials."' 1 7 The court
noted that there were a number of inmate writwriters but that
they were scattered throughout the various facilities and that "it is
possible that a particular camp may be bereft of a 'jail-house'
lawyer."11
The Stevenson court invoked the Johnson v. Avery'1 9 standard
of "reasonably adequate" access. The Stevenson court held that
the standard of "reasonably adequate" access could be fulfilled by
a "reasonable, straightforward and intelligible statement" which
could be produced through the "experience and native intelligence
. . . [of] a competent writwriter."1 20 The court stated:
111. The Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down before October 1, 1978. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
112. 391 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Miss. 1975), affd per curiam, 530 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
113. Id. at 1377.
114. Id. at 1383.
115. Stevenson v. Reed, 530 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
116. 391 F. Supp. at 1378.
117. Id. at 1379 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 1378.
119. 393 U.S. at 483.
120. 391 F. Supp. at 1382 (emphasis added). The court also approved of the use of an
institutional attorney or a "free-world paralegal." Id. at 1382.
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State-supplied legal counsel would... be of material benefit to
any modern correctional facility . [but . . .our Constitution
does not require all that is or may be deemed socially desira-
ble. . . .Neither . ..must penitentiary administrators "adopt
every proposal that may be thought to facilitate prisoner access to
the courts." Alternative programs may be adopted which, without
legal counsel, permit prisoners to seek out necessary assistance
...and under which effective access to the courts is possible. 2'
Stevenson briefly addressed the 1972 decision of Hooks v. Wain-
wright.'22 The court rejected the suggestion to follow Hooks "to
the extent that it may be read as requiring both counsel and a full
and complete law library."' 23 It can be argued that this rejection of
the earlier Hooks decision should not be dispositive upon appeal of
the present Hooks decision. The rejection was based on the earlier
Hooks opinion's reliance on the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The present decision is based, however, on the
Supreme Court's mandate in Bounds which was premised on the
due process clause.'2 4
Whether the stance of the Stevenson court will be the position
taken by the Eleventh Circuit upon the appeal of the present deci-
sion remains to be seen. Contrary to the Hooks findings, the Ste-
venson court found that institutional writwriters were competent
to provide meaningful access.'25 The Hooks court found Florida's
writwriters not to be competent and emphasized that different fac-
tual situations will require different methods of providing mean-
ingful access. 2 6
Secondly, Stevenson was a pre-Bounds decision in which the
court found the constitutional minimum was "reasonably ade-
quate" rather than "meaningful access." It is likely, however, that
the difference in the articulation of the standards is not significant.
The Supreme Court itself in Bounds phrased the issue as what
form or forms of assistance were needed to provide prisoners a
"reasonable adequate opportunity" to present their claims to a
121. Id. at 1382 (citations omitted).
122. 352 F. Supp. at 168.
123. 391 F. Supp. at 1381 n.9.
124. 430 U.S. at 818.
125. 391 F. Supp. at 1382. "We note first that no evidence has been presented that
Parchman is devoid of competent writwriters. To the contrary, this court knows from its
records and files that writs are received on almost a daily basis." Id.
126. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1341 ("[tjhe decision ... today rests upon this factual
record.").
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court. 2 ' In Jones v. Diamond, 128 a post-Bounds decision, the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed the Stevenson holding. Although not specifically
addressing the issue of attorneys, the court in Stevenson held that
meaningful access for prisoners at that institution was satisfied be-
cause the library had been found to be adequate. Therefore, for
"all convicted criminals .. .at Parchman, the State would, in all
likelihood, have fulfilled its obligation under Bounds.' 129 In addi-
tion, in another post-Bounds Fifth Circuit case, Lynott v. Hender-
son,1° the court in dicta equated the meaningful access standard
of Bounds with "access to a threshold level of legal information or
aid."13 1 Therefore, it is quite possible that the Fifth Circuit
equates "meaningful access" with "reasonably adequate" and
"threshold level." If this is true, then, the court in Stevenson ap-
plied the proper constitutional standard in a case factually similar
to the case at hand to reach an opposite conclusion. The Eleventh
Circuit may be inclined to follow the Fifth Circuit's approach in
Stevenson and reverse the Hooks decision.
Judge Scott claimed to find support 32 for his position that law-
yers are an essential ingredient of Florida's duty to provide in-
mates with meaningful access to the courts in another Fifth Circuit
decision, Cruz v. Hauck." ' A reading of the case, however, fails to
reveal support for the court's interpretation. The language in Cruz,
that "[u]nless the library adequately provides access to the courts
for all inmates, some other assistance should be available for the
initiation of habeas corpus and civil rights actions,"' does not
properly lead to the conclusion that "some other assistance" refers
to the assistance of counsel. It had been claimed that all indigent
inmates in Cruz were being provided with counsel. The court, how-
ever, was forced to remand the case to determine whether this as-
sistance was available at the time of the filing of legal papers, as
required by Bounds.'3 5 The language of Cruz which was empha-
sized in Hooks does no more than restate the Bounds mandate of
either state-provided law libraries or other forms of assistance. It
makes no suggestion as to what form this assistance must take. In-
127. 430 U.S. at 825.
128. 594 F.2d 997.
129. Id. at 1024.
130. 610 F.2d 340.
131. Id. at 342 n.1.
132. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1350.
133. 627 F.2d 710.
134. Id. at 721.
135. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
deed, the opinion repeatedly offers suggestions of forms of assis-
tance, other than counsel, which would be adequate by themselves
in satisfying Bounds. These alternate forms included paralegal and
paralibrarian assistance and writwriters.' s3 Thus, Judge Scott can
point to no decision directly supporting his postion, and instead he
must rely on the unique characteristics of Florida's inmates and
prison system as demonstrated in the factual record.13 7
The decision in Hooks is one which the court conceded might
appear to be a radical departure from precedent.138 Indeed, the
district court recognized the import of its holding and thus certi-
fied its decision as an appealable order.13 Yet, Justice Rehnquist
in his dissent in Bounds foresaw such a ruling as only a logical
extension of the majority's reasoning. 1 0 Justice Rehnquist was
quite correct. Formulation of the parameters of the Bounds defini-
tion of meaningful access to the courts was left to the lower courts
with little guidance. It is not surprising then that one would con-
clude that only a licensed attorney possesses that degree of compe-
tence and familiarity with the intricacies of the law to provide ac-
cess that is truly meaningful. It may be that the federal judiciary
prior to the Hooks decision had intruded upon the prison system
as far as judicial restraint would allow.'"' On the other hand, the
provision of attorney assistance to indigent, illiterate prisoners
may be an idea whose time has finally come. The Supreme Court,
although addressing another aspect of the right to counsel issue,
136. Id. 720-21.
137. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. at 1341.
138. Id. at 1352.
139. Id. at 1353. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeal-
able under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a control-
ling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry
of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
140. 430 U.S. at 841 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Constitutional Law-Corrections-
Prisoners' Constitutional Right of Access to Courts Imposes Duty on State to Provide
Prison Law Libraries, 23 VILL. L. REv. 613, 624 (1978) (noting professional or quasi-profes-
sional assistance was the logical extension of Bounds but that the opinion could be inter-
preted to require attorneys).
141. Special Project, Of Trumpeters, Pipers, and Swingmen: What Tune Is the Burger
Court Playing in Right to Representation Cases? 29 VAND. L. REV. 776, 803 (1976).
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said fully fifty years ago that:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law .... He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have [sic] a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.""'
Many would agree that these words apply equally as well to pro-
ceedings involving post conviction relief." s
JEFFREY WILLS LEWIs
142. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
143. Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131, 1142, 1146-47 (W.D. Wis. 1978); Comment,
Constitutional Law: Prisoners' Right of Access to Legal Materials, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 161,
164-66 (1973); Comment, Prisoners' Rights - Access to Courts, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 275, 290-
91 (1970); Larsen, supra note 50, at 363; Application for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post
Conviction Review of Sentences in the United States, 33 F.R.D. 363, 385 (1963).
